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A test of advanced theory of mind (ToM), first introduced by F. Happe´ (1994), was adapted for children (men-
tal, human, animal, and nature stories plus unlinked sentences). These materials were closely matched for dif-
ficulty and were presented to forty-five 7- to 12-year-olds with autism and 27 control children. Children with
autism who showed ToM impairment on independent tests performed significantly more poorly than controls
solely on the mental, human, and animal stories with greatest impairment on the former and least on the lat-
ter. Thus, a mentalizing deficit may affect understanding of biologic agents even when this does not explicitly
require understanding others’ mental states.
Since Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith’s (1985) study,
there has been an immense interest in the theory-
of-mind (ToM) theory of autism. Individuals with
autism were shown to have specific problems in
understanding other people’s mental states, an abil-
ity that has come to be known as mentalizing. Defi-
cits in mentalizing make intuitive sense of the
characteristic social and communicative impair-
ments in autism spectrum disorders (ASDs), and
relations have been demonstrated between tests of
mentalizing and everyday social insight (Frith,
Happe´, & Siddons, 1994). However, tests to assess
mentalizing ability are scarce and the simple tests
often used tend to suffer from ceiling effects.
The Strange Stories (Happe´, 1994) provide a
means of testing advanced mentalizing ability,
which is suitable for both higher functioning chil-
dren and adults (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore,
& Robertson, 1997; Gillott, Furniss, & Walter, 2001;
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999a; Kaland et al., 2005),
as well as patients with acquired brain lesions
(Happe´, Brownell, & Winner, 1999). Subjects read
short vignettes and are asked to explain why a
character says something that is not literally true.
Successful performance thus requires attribution of
mental states such as desires, beliefs or intentions,
and sometimes higher order mental states such as
one character’s belief about what another character
knows.
Happe´’s (1994) original set of 24 stories was
accompanied by a smaller set of six control stories
requiring understanding of physical states. All par-
ticipants in Happe´’s study performed at ceiling on
these control stories, which were not equated for
difficulty with the mental state stories. It is there-
fore possible that the poor performance of the aut-
ism group on the mental state questions could have
been due to general comprehension problems or
the need to integrate information and make infer-
ences across the text, which were not revealed by
the easier physical state stories. In fact, comprehen-
sion problems and problems with inferences are a
common feature of high-functioning individuals on
the autism spectrum (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen,
1999b; Norbury & Bishop, 2002). Problems in inte-
grating information, one aspect of so-called ‘‘weak
central coherence,’’ are therefore an alternative
explanation for failure on the mental state stories,
a possibility discussed by both Happe´ and Jolliffe
and Baron-Cohen (1999a).
In subsequent development of the Strange Sto-
ries for functional brain imaging using PET
(Fletcher et al., 1995), a subset of the eight most
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demanding mental state stories was selected,
involving understanding of double bluff, white lie,
persuasion, and misunderstanding. To test for the
specificity of any difficulty with these stories, eight
control stories were created that required reasoning
about physical states only, and were of comparable
difficulty in healthy young adults. An additional
set of eight passages of unlinked sentences was also
created; here, participants were required to recall a
specific fact from one sentence. All sets therefore
involved people and required attention to sentence
meaning, memory, and question answering,
whereas the mental and physical state sets also
required the integration of information between
sentences and inference from implicit information,
and only the mental state set required mentalizing.
These well-controlled stimuli enabled a ‘‘mental-
izing network’’ in the brain to be revealed, including
medial prefrontal cortex, superior temporal sulcus
(STS) and the temporal poles. Reduced activation in
this network was seen in adults with Asperger
syndrome (AS; Happe´ et al., 1996). Here, 5 adults
were chosen to be extremely high functioning and to
perform well at these tasks, to allow valid scan
comparisons. Despite this, the behavioral results still
showed a significant difference between the groups
on the mental state stories but not on the physical or
unlinked stories. However, this study had low
power to detect even small or moderate effects, and
examination of the group means revealed that the
performance of the adults with AS was slightly
lower than controls on the physical state stories and
slightly higher on the unlinked sentences. A recent
study of 20 high-functioning children with ASDs
(Brent, Rios, Happe´, & Charman, 2004), found a sim-
ilar pattern of performance in a reduced subset of
these mental and physical state story sets, showing
significantly poorer performance than age- and
IQ-matched controls on the mental state set, and a
slight trend toward poorer performance on the
physical state set.
The present study was motivated by the need to
investigate the scope and limitation of the three sets
of Strange Stories that were used in the identifica-
tion of the brain’s mentalizing system. The first pilot
study therefore tested the three sets in the largest
samples of both adult and child high-functioning
populations to date. Of particular interest was
whether populations with autism, despite a high
intellectual level, would have difficulties not only
with the mental state stories but possibly also with
the physical state stories, either due to more general
comprehension problems or to the fact that both
types of stories contained human protagonists and
were thus not as distinct as they might be in terms
of the presence and absence of the requirement to
mentalize (see also Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003).
Pilot Study With Story Materials Used by
Fletcher et al. (1995)
Method
Participants
Twenty-three high-functioning adults and 39 chil-
dren, all clinically diagnosed as having an autistic
disorder (including autism, AS, and ASD), took part
in this study, compared to 40 adult and 41 child con-
trol participants. The groups did not significantly
differ on gender: adults, v2(1) = 2.80, p = .094; chil-
dren, v2(1) = 2.94, p = .086; age: adults, t(61) = 1.29;
children, t(78) = 0.33; or nonverbal (performance
IQ): adults, t(61) = 0.41; children, t(64.62) = 0.03.
The majority of participants were Caucasian and
from middle-class families. Although there was a
trend for more males to be present in the ASD than
control groups, no differences were found between
males and females on any matching or experimental
measure in either control group, indicating that gen-
der could not account for any group differences.
The adults were all selected to have nonverbal
IQs above 85 and were aged between 16 and
63 years. The children were aged between 7 and
11 years and had nonverbal IQs ranging from 70
upward. As can be seen in Table 1, the children
with ASD had a lower mean verbal IQ than the non-
verbal IQ-matched controls, t(78) = 5.42, p < .001,
whereas the ASD adults were well matched to the
control adults on verbal IQ, t(61) = 0.50.
The children were recruited through mainstream
schools and special schools for children with such
diagnoses. Adult participants were recruited
through advertisements placed around the local
community and through AS support groups
throughout the United Kingdom. The ASD adults
had significantly elevated scores on the Autism-
Spectrum Quotient questionnaire (Baron-Cohen,
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001),
t(48) = 9.09, p < .001; possible range of scores 0–50.
None of the control participants were reported or
were known to have any developmental disorders
or family history of such difficulties.
Materials
The materials were the three text sets used first
in Fletcher et al.’s (1995) study: eight mental state
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stories, eight physical state stories, and eight pas-
sages of unlinked sentences (see the Appendix for
the full test materials).
Procedure
Informed consent (from the participant or their
parent, as appropriate) was obtained prior to
involvement in the study. Each participant was
tested individually in a quiet room either at the
UCL Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience (for the
vast majority of adults), at their school (for the vast
majority of children), or at their home.
For the children, verbal IQ was measured using
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS; Dunn,
Dunn, Whetton, & Burley, 1997) whereas Raven’s
Standard Progressive Matrices (Raven, Court, &
Raven, 1988) were used to ascertain nonverbal IQ.
The intelligence of the adult participants was mea-
sured using the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scales
(WAIS–III–UK; Wechsler, 1997).
The children performed four additional tests of
ToM: two first-order false belief tasks, Sally-Ann
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1985) and Smarties (Perner,
Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987), and two second-order
false belief tasks, Ice Cream Van (Baron-Cohen,
1989) and Birthday Puppy (Sullivan, Zaitchik, &
Tager-Flusberg, 1994). The adults performed both
the Sally-Ann task and a second-order Coat Story
task (Bowler, 1992).
All three sets of text (Fletcher et al., 1995) were
presented on cards to each participant in three sep-
arate blocks, randomized both within each story
type as well as between story type. These were read
aloud to the children, whereas the adults read the
stories silently themselves. When the story had
been read, the card was then turned over and the
participant was presented with a question about its
content. Verbal responses were recorded and the
accuracy of each response was rated on a 0–2 scale
by two researchers: 0 for an incorrect answer, 1 for
a partially or implicitly correct answer, and 2 for a
fully correct answer. A maximum score of 16 was
therefore possible. Scoring schemes for the stories
are given in the Appendix. Good agreement was
reached (intraclass correlation coefficient = .89)
between the first author and a corater blind to
group. Response time was also recorded for the
adult participants, defined as the time from starting
to read the story to the time when starting to
answer verbally the question. Mean response times
across all story responses in a set were calculated.
Results
Children
Significantly, more children in the ASD group
than the control group failed each of the false belief
tests: Sally-Ann, v2(1) = 6.04, p = .014; Smarties,
v2(1) = 8.57, p = .003; Ice Cream Van, v2(1) = 21.66,
p < .001; Birthday Puppy, v2(1) = 17.35, p < .001.
Figure 1 shows the results from the stories tasks.
As the groups were not matched for verbal ability
Table 1
Participant Characteristics and Background Theory of Mind Results From the Pilot Study
ASD children Control children ASD adults Control adults
N (male:female) 39 (33:6) 41 (28:13) 23 (17:6) 40 (21:19)
Age (years) 9.73 (1.22) 9.64 (1.26) 31.22 (13.32) 35.50 (12.30)
Nonverbal IQ 98 (18.34) 98 (11.88) 114 (18.25) 111 (16.11)
Verbal IQ child*** 86 (10.84) 99 (9.91) 107 (12.50) 109 (13.79)
Clinical diagnosis 7 Autism
11 AS
21 ASD
— 23 AS —
AQ (cutoff 32) adult*** — — 34.14 (7.62) 16.62 (7.85)
Sally-Ann (% passing) child* 72 93 96 100
Smarties (% passing) child** 74 97 — —
Ice Cream Van (% passing) child*** 41 90 — —
Birthday Puppy (% passing) child*** 58 97 — —
Coat Story (% passing) adult** — — 70 95
Note. Values are given as mean (standard deviation) except when otherwise stated. The asterisks following ‘‘adult’’ or ‘‘child’’ indicate
which pairing of groups are significantly different from one another. ASD = autism spectrum disorder; AS = Asperger syndrome;
AQ = autism-spectrum quotient.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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and story performance was generally related to ver-
bal ability (r ‡ .40, p £ .009 except for the control
group on the unlinked sentences: r = .14), individ-
ual performance levels across each story set were
calculated by entering data for each story type from
the control group as the dependent variable in a
regression with verbal ability (BPVS raw score) as
the predictor variable. This regression equation was
then applied to the ASD group and residuals were
collected, and were converted to z scores in relation
to the control group’s mean and standard devia-
tion. These z scores were then used in all further
analyses. Given the control group range of verbal
ability spanned that of the ASD group, this method
was considered appropriate (Miller & Chapman,
2001).
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparing
story type (mental ⁄physical) by group (ASD ⁄ con-
trol) revealed a main effect of group, F(1,
78) = 37.89, p < .001, gp
2 = .32, with the ASD group
performing below the control group. An interaction
was also found between group and story type,
F(1, 78) = 22.95, p < .001, gp
2 = .23; the main effect
of story type was identical to this interaction as z
scores relative to the control group mean were
used. Post hoc comparisons revealed that the aut-
ism group performed below the controls on both
the mental (p < .001, gp
2 = .39) and physical
(p = .003, gp
2 = .23) stories, and that the ASD group
also performed more poorly on the mental than
physical stories (p < .001, gp
2 = .50).
As the unlinked sentences had a ‘‘yes–no’’ rather
than an open question, these scores were analyzed
separately. A t test revealed that the performance
of the children with autism was lower than the
controls on these passages, t(78) = 2.23, p = .029,
d = .50.
Adults. There was no group difference in the
number of adults passing the first-order Sally-Ann
task, v2(1) = 1.77, but significantly more ASD adults
failed the second-order Coat Story task, v2(1) =
7.72, p = .005.
An ANOVA comparing story type (mental,
physical) by group (ASD, control) revealed a bor-
derline main effect of group, F(1, 61) = 3.97,
p = .051, gp
2 = .06, due to the ASD adults perform-
ing less accurately than the control group (see Fig-
ure 2a). A main effect of story type was also found,
F(1, 61) = 7.64, p = .008, gp
2 = .11, indicating that
the mental state stories were easier than the physi-
cal state stories. However, there was no interaction
between group and story type, F(1, 61) = 0.31.
Additionally, no difference in performance was
found between groups on the unlinked sentences,
t(60) = 0.01.
However, when the same analysis was repeated
using the response time data, in addition to main
effects of group, F(1, 60) = 42.45, p < .001, gp
2 = .41,
and story type, F(1, 60) = 5.67, p = .020, gp
2 = .09,
a trend toward an interaction between group and
story type was found, F(1, 60) = 3.56, p = .064,
gp
2 = .06. Both groups were quicker at responding
to the mental than physical state stories (ASD
p = .009, gp
2 = .29; controls p < .001, gp
2 = .56).
However, although there was a significant differ-
ence between the groups on the mental state stories
(p = .017, gp
2 = .14) with the ASD group respond-
ing slower, this difference was not significant on
the physical state stories (see Figure 2b). There was
also a difference between the groups on the
unlinked sentences (p = .015, gp
2 = .14).
Discussion
The results from the standard false belief tasks
confirm previous studies demonstrating the pres-
ence of specific mentalizing deficits at the group
level in both children and adults. This is remark-
able as the performance of the present high-
functioning participants was close to ceiling. As
regards the Strange Stories, close to ceiling perfor-
mance probably precluded differences in accuracy
to be shown in the adult group on the mental state
set (74% of ASD group and 85% of control group
scoring 12 or more of 16), but the ASD group was
significantly slower in responding only to mental
state stories specifically. In the ASD child sample,
Figure 1. Performance on mental and human physical state
stories and unlinked sentences by control and autism spectrum
disorder (ASD) children after accounting for verbal level in the
pilot study. Scores are presented as z scores relative to the
control group; error bars are standard errors.
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performance was generally at a lower level com-
pared to controls, but the greatest impairment was
revealed on the mental state stories. Nevertheless,
the small if significant differences on the nonmental
state stories suggest that other confounding factors
may be inherent in the story materials, and these
might be identified by systematically changing
story content.
One interesting possibility is that differences
between mental and physical state story perfor-
mance might have been diminished as both
require processing information about human
characters. For example, a study by Blair, Frith,
Smith, Abell, and Cipolotti (2002) showed that
visual recognition memory in high-functioning
adults with autism was significantly poorer for
stimuli that were potential agents capable of self-
initiated movement, compared to buildings or
leaves that could not be described as self-pro-
pelled agents. Likewise, the recognition of bio-
logic motion from random dot kinematograms
has been shown to be impaired in children with
ASD (Blake, Turner, Smoski, Pozdol, & Stone,
2003). In line with these behavioral findings, the
STS, the main brain area thought to process bio-
logic motion (Bonda, Petrides, Ostry, & Evans,
1996) has been shown to be functionally and
structurally abnormal in individuals with ASD
(Boddaert et al., 2004; Pelphrey, Adolphs, & Mor-
ris, 2004; Waiter et al., 2004). The STS region is
one of the main components of the mentalizing
system in the brain and has consistently been
found to be activated in typical adults when
reading both the mental and physical state
Strange Stories (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher
et al., 2000). Furthermore, the same neural areas
of medial prefrontal cortex, another main compo-
nent of the brain’s mentalizing network, were
activated for both animals and humans when
volunteers were asked to think about their men-
tal as opposed to physical states (Mitchell, Banaji,
& Macrae, 2005). This might indicate that pro-
cessing information about all animate agents may
be impaired in ASD and hence depress perfor-
mance even in those stories that did not explic-
itly require mentalizing.
There is also evidence to show that the network
of brain areas thought to be involved in mental-
izing is also activated when making nonmentalistic
semantic judgments about people as opposed to
objects (Mitchell, Heatherton, & Macrae, 2002),
although possibly to a lesser extent than when
performing an explicit mentalizing task (Fletcher
et al., 1995). This suggests that mentalizing may aid
understanding of agents, even when mental state
processing is not explicitly required.
In line with these considerations, two new sets
of physical stories for use with children involv-
ing either animals or natural events were there-
fore added to the original three sets of stories.
They therefore allow us to investigate the level
at which children with ASD have problems, spe-
cifically with mentalizing, with making inferences
about agents, or with story comprehension (see
Table 2). In the next study, mentalizing ability
was also independently assessed by a large bat-
tery of ToM tests. It was anticipated that, in a
group of high-functioning children with ASD,
individual differences would be found in
mentalizing ability. It was of particular interest
whether a severely ToM impaired subgroup
would also show poor performance on mental
state stories, but unimpaired performance on the
other stories.
Figure 2. Performance on mental and human physical state stories and unlinked sentences by control and autism spectrum disorder
(ASD) adults in the pilot study. Accuracy is shown in (a) and response times in (b); error bars are standard errors.
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As regards testing of children, it should be
noted that the mental state stories were substan-
tially easier than the human physical state stories
for the control children in the pilot study and
that performance on the physical state stories
was generally very poor. This is likely to be due
to the contents of some of the physical stories
requiring a level of world knowledge beyond
that of most children of this age to comprehend
the story. It is therefore possible that a floor
effect may have been acting differentially across
story types in the children, reducing the differ-
ence between the performance of the two groups
on the physical state stories only (although this
could not have been the case in the adults’
response times). This would mean that the inter-
action, and therefore the specific mentalizing
impairment, may have been an artifact of this
floor effect. The original set of human physical
state stories was therefore modified to be more
appropriate for children and matched to the
mental state stories for difficulty, to eliminate
any differential floor effects.
The poor performance by the children with ASD
on the unlinked sentences was also difficult to
interpret as these passages involved closed ques-
tions requiring a ‘‘yes’’ or ‘‘no’’ response and there-
fore encouraged guessing. To ensure correct
answers represented understanding and memory of
sentence meaning rather than chance performance,
this set was modified to involve open questions
(e.g., When is Mary’s birthday?).
Main Experiment With Newly Devised Story
Materials
This next study attempts to identify and provide a
detailed analysis of the difficulties individuals with
autism have with understanding the Strange Stories
and the possible causes of these. The physical sto-
ries and unlinked sentences were modified to make
them more appropriate for a child population, and
two novel sets of stories were added to aid the
investigation of difficulties in understanding mental
states and agents and with text comprehension. The
procedure was also standardized by prerecording
the stories and presenting them on a computer.
Method
Participants
A new sample of 45 children with ASD aged 7–
12 years took part, matched to 27 control partici-
pants for gender, v2(1) = 2.51; age, t(70) = 0.74; ver-
bal, t(70) = 0.95; and performance IQ, t(70) = 1.78.
All but 3 children in each group were Caucasian
and the majority were from middle-class families.
As can be seen in Table 3, the children with ASD
had slightly lower mean verbal and performance
IQ scores than the controls, so individual variation
was taken into account in the analyses. As their IQ
scores indicate, these children were an extremely
high functioning sample and all but two attended a
mainstream school. All these children had previ-
ously received a diagnosis of autism, AS, or ASD
from a qualified clinician prior to participation in the
Table 2
Task Requirements for the Different Strange Story Sets
Mental Human Animal Nature Unlinked
Explicit mentalizing a 7 7 7 7
Thinking about
humans
a a 7 7 7
Thinking about
animate agents
a a a 7 7
Integration of info
across text
a a a a 7
Sentence
comprehension
a a a a a
Table 3
Participant Characteristics and Background Theory of Mind Results
From the Main Experiment
ASD
children
Control
children
N (male:female) 45 (41:4) 27 (21:6)
Age (years) 9.24 (1.39) 9.48 (1.35)
Verbal IQ 111 (14.70) 115 (15.78)
Performance IQ 98 (11.18) 103 (12.35)
Clinical diagnosis 8 Autism
25 AS
12 ASD
—
3Di
Social (cutoff 10)*** 12.71 (4.20) 3.34 (2.00)
Communication (cutoff 8)*** 14.77 (3.37) 3.73 (1.68)
Repetitive behavior (cutoff 3)*** 4.90 (2.40) 0.35 (0.54)
Background ToM battery
(max. 25)**
16.34 (3.80) 18.98 (2.54)
Note. Values are given as mean (standard deviation) except
when otherwise stated. ASD = autism spectrum disorder;
AS = Asperger syndrome; 3Di = Developmental, Dimensional,
and Diagnostic Interview; ToM = theory of mind.
**p < .01. ***p < .001.
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study. In addition, all met objective criteria for an
ASD on the Developmental, Dimensional, and Diag-
nostic Interview (3Di; Skuse et al., 2004) at the time
of this study, whereas none of the controls did,
social, communication, and repetitive behavior
domains, t(66) > 11, p < .001; possible range of
scores: social 0–30, communication 0–26, repetitive
behavior 0–12. The 3Di measure is similar to the
Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI–R; Lord, Rutter,
& Le Couteur, 1994) with which it correlates highly
(Skuse et al., 2004). None of the control participants
was reported or was known to have any develop-
mental disorders or family history of such diffi-
culties.
Materials and Procedure
Verbal and performance IQ were measured
using the WISC–III–UK; (Wechsler, 1992).
Standard ToM battery. The children performed 12
tests of ToM previously established as discriminating
between autistic and typically developing samples of
children. They were presented in a random order
with accompanying props. Seven of the tasks were
those used by Wellman and Liu (2004) and the 5
additional tasks were expected to be more challeng-
ing for the older children involved here (Ice cream
Van: Baron-Cohen, 1989; Penny Hiding: Baron-
Cohen, 1992; Sally-Ann: Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Interpretational False Belief: Luckett, Powell, Messer,
Thornton, & Schulz, 2002; Birthday Puppy: Sullivan
et al., 1994). These were scored out of a total of 25.
Eleven of the tasks consisted of situations in
which a character and the child had diverse desires
or diverse beliefs; where a character had a lack of
knowledge, a false belief, or a false belief about
another character’s false belief; or where a character
wanted to create a false belief in others. In all cases,
the child was asked to predict the knowledge of,
behavior of or emotion felt by another character on
the basis of their mental state; this answer was
marked as a pass or fail (1 or 0). In all but the three
simplest tasks, the child was also asked to justify
why they had made that prediction; this was
marked as a correct mental state justification (e.g.,
‘‘because she doesn’t know it’s in the box’’), a cor-
rect nonmental state justification (e.g., ‘‘because she
left it in the basket’’), or an incorrect justification
(e.g., ‘‘because no-one stole it apart from Anne’’; 1,
0.5, or 0, respectively). This additional scoring
aimed to check for false positive responses when
the child was achieving the correct answer by
guessing, and also was expected to increase the
variation in responses with the aim of avoiding
ceiling effects. Control questions were administered
(e.g., memory and reality questions; also prompt
questions during the more complex tasks), which
all individuals were required to pass, to check for
comprehension of the scenario.
The remaining task, accounting for a maximum
of six marks, was the penny-hiding task; this
involved six trials when the experimenter modeled
hiding the coin to the child, followed by six test
trials when the child was encouraged to hide
the coin. One point was awarded on each trial if
the experimenter was unable to tell which hand the
coin was hidden in; half a point was given if the
child made no obvious mistake but held their
hands asymmetrically; and the child gained no
points if they failed to deceive the experimenter
(e.g., not hiding both hands behind their back,
bringing only one hand out, not closing the empty
hand, leaving the coin in sight).
Modified sets of Strange Stories. The three text sets
used in the pilot study were again used but with
four of the original human-physical stories (last
four in Appendix; these were the most difficult
according to results from an independent sample
of typically developing children) replaced by four
new, easier human-physical stories (from here on
referred to as human stories; the full new human
set was matched in difficulty to the mental state
set in an independent sample of typically devel-
oping children). The questions accompanying the
eight passages of unlinked sentences were modi-
fied to be open rather than closed questions. In
addition, two new sets of eight animal-physical
stories and eight nature-physical stories were cre-
ated, matched to the mental state set for difficulty
in an independent sample of typically developing
children (see the Appendix for the full test mate-
rials). To illustrate the difference between the
story types, an example of each is given as
follows.
Mental
During the war, the Red army captures a mem-
ber of the Blue army. They want him to tell them
where his army’s tanks are; they know they are
either by the sea or in the mountains. They know
that the prisoner will not want to tell them, he
will want to save his army, and so he will cer-
tainly lie to them. The prisoner is very brave and
very clever, he will not let them find his tanks.
The tanks are really in the mountains. Now
when the other side asks him where his tanks
are, he says, ‘‘They are in the mountains.’’
Q: Why did the prisoner say that?
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Human
Bob and Jim are best friends. They are both
10 years old. Bob has brown hair, green eyes and
is over 5 feet tall. Jim looks very different to Bob.
He has blonde hair and blue eyes and he is
much smaller than Bob. Bob and Jim go on an
outing to the fun fair. They go on lots of rides.
For the last ride of the day they decide to go on
the big rollercoaster. But there is a sign which
says: For safety reasons, no persons under 5 feet
are allowed on.
Q: Why does only Bob go on the rollercoaster?
Animal
Emperor penguins live in the Antarctica, where
it is extremely cold. There is always snow on the
ground and ice on the surface of the sea.
Emperor penguins can often be found standing
clumped together in huge, huddled masses.
Every few minutes, a penguin in the middle of
the huddle moves to the edge of the huddle,
changing places with one of the penguins on the
outside of the group.
Q: Why do the penguins keep changing places?
Nature
It is late in April and the sky has been clear and
blue all morning. An empty fountain sparkles in
the middle of the park. As the day goes on, the
sun occasionally disappears behind little white
fluffy clouds, soon to appear again on the other
side. However in the late afternoon, the sky
becomes dark and filled with lots of gray clouds.
A little after this, the fountain starts to spout
water.
Q: Why did the fountain spout water?
Unlinked
At the edge of the road, a little grass was grow-
ing. He reaches out to find the light switch. A
sailor who has just left his ship is walking to the
town. She has to decide where to keep the pasta.
At last daylight came, and Tommy got out of
bed to open his presents. Jim knows all about
investing money, as he works in a large bank.
They exchanged a few brief words about the
weather.
Q: Why did Tommy get out of bed?
All five sets of Strange Stories text were pre-
sented on a laptop computer using E-Prime soft-
ware, both as written and spoken text to aid
concentration. Each story was prerecorded by an
adult male speaker and lasted approximately 30 s.
The full text of each story was presented on the
screen and the child was invited to follow the
words while listening to the recording. Five hun-
dred milliseconds after the spoken text had ended,
a question about its content was presented on the
screen and simultaneously spoken by the prere-
corded voice. The experimenter recorded the
child’s answer verbatim on paper and this was
scored later.
The stories were presented in blocks of eight sto-
ries, one block for each story type. The animal and
nature stories were presented in a second test ses-
sion approximately 4 months after the other three
sets of stories. The order of the blocks within each
session and the order of the stories within each
block were randomized. The accuracy of each ver-
bal response was rated on a 0–2 scale as before
(scoring schemes are given in the Appendix). Good
agreement (intraclass correlation coefficient = .81)
was reached between the first author and a corater
blind to group based on a sample of answers to
each question (20% of answers selected randomly
for each story).
Results
As can be seen from Table 3, performance on the
ToM battery differed between the groups, with the
ASD group performing more poorly than the con-
trols, F(1, 67) = 8.556, p = .005.
Individual performance levels across all story
sets were calculated by entering data for each story
type as the dependent variable in a regression, with
age, verbal, and performance IQ as predictors.
Residuals were collected and hence represented
individual variance in the story data that could not
be explained by age or IQ, and these scores were
converted to z scores in relation to the control
group’s mean and standard deviation. These z
scores were then used in all further analyses.
A good match for difficulty was obtained
between the new and old story sets in the typically
developing children (mean of 11 or 12 of 16 for all
story sets; mean of 9 for unlinked passages). A
5 · 2 repeated measures ANOVA comparing story
type by group revealed a main effect of group, F(1,
70) = 8.59, p = .005, gp
2 = .11, with the performance
of the ASD group generally falling below that of
the controls. Furthermore, a significant interaction
was found between story type and group, F(4,
280) = 2.78, p = .027, gp
2 = .04; again, the main
effect of story type was identical to this interaction
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as z scores relative to the control group mean were
used, with the ASD group performing below the
control group only on the mental (p = .002,
gp
2 = .13), human (p = .009, gp
2 = .09), and animal
(p = .020, gp
2 = .08) stories. This interaction fol-
lowed a linear relation between the groups across
the different story types, F(1, 70) = 8.69, p = .004,
gp
2 = .11, with the greatest difference on the mental
state stories and the smallest difference on the
unlinked sentences.
Item analyses were conducted to investigate
which stories were influencing these group differ-
ences. Importantly, across all eight stories in each
of the mental, human, and animal sets, the ASD
group mean was consistently lower than that of the
control group. Significant group differences were
found on five of the mental (in the order in the
Appendix, stories 1, 2, 4, 5, 6), four of the human
(original physical stories 2, 3, 4, new human physi-
cal story 1), and three of the animal stories (stories
1, 2, 7), although trends toward group differences
were seen on the other stories too.
As a stringent test of the stories’ power to assess
poor mentalizing ability, the ASD group was split
into two subgroups on the basis of their perfor-
mance on the background ToM battery. Any child
with ASD performing more than 1.65 SD (fifth per-
centile) below the corrected control mean (see
White et al., 2006, for further details of methodo-
logy used here) was defined as having unquestion-
ably poor ToM (15 children) and the remaining
children as having relatively good ToM (30 chil-
dren). This latter group included children whose
performance was still below the control group
mean (22 children) as well as those performing
above the control group mean (8 children). The two
subgroups of poor ToM and relatively good ToM
did not differ from each other on age, t(43) = 0.103;
verbal, t(43) = 1.00; or performance IQ, t(43) = 0.68,
but the children with poor ToM were reported to
display more severe social, t(39) = 2.49, p = .017,
d = .83, and communication, t(39) = 2.20, p = .034,
d = .69, symptoms, but not repetitive behaviors,
t(39) = 0.34, on the 3Di. Although there was overlap
between those children with ASD with poor or rela-
tively good ToM, every child with poor ToM as
defined by the ToM battery had performance below
the control mean on the mental state Strange
Stories. Furthermore, the mental state Strange
Stories were highly correlated with the ToM battery
in the ASD group (r = .42, p = .001); as variance
in age and IQ had already been accounted for in
these variables, this relation is independent of these
factors.
A 5 · 3 repeated measures ANOVA comparing
story type by group (poor ToM ASD, relatively
good ToM ASD, control) was performed. As before,
this produced main effects of group, F(2, 69) = 9.77,
p < .001, gp
2 = .22, as well as an interaction, F(8,
276) = 2.01, p = .045, gp
2 = .06, which followed a
linear relation, F(2, 69) = 5.89, p = .004, gp
2 = .15,
between the groups across the different story types
(see Figure 3). Post hoc tests revealed that the poor
ToM ASD group was performing overall more
poorly than both other groups (p £ .008, gp2 = .15),
which were performing similarly. The linear inter-
action resulted mainly from the poor ToM sub-
group performing below the controls on the mental
(p < .001, gp
2 = .35), human (p = .001, gp
2 = .25),
and animal (p = .015, gp
2 = .14) stories. The ASD
subgroup with relatively good ToM did not differ
significantly from the controls in their performance.
The relatively good and poor ToM subgroups dif-
fered significantly in their performance on the men-
tal stories only (p = .007, gp
2 = .16).
Discussion
The five sets of stories used in this experiment
were found to be well matched in difficulty for the
children involved, indicating that any interaction of
story type by group could not be accounted for by
floor or ceiling effects acting differentially across
the different story sets. This allows for greater con-
fidence in the results than for those of the pilot
study, although the results from both studies were
very similar.
Figure 3. Performance on story sets by control and autism
spectrum disorder (ASD) children after accounting for age and
IQ in the main experiment. The ASD group is divided into those
with relatively good and poor theory of mind (ToM) on the basis
of performance on the background ToM tests. Scores are
presented as z scores relative to the control group; error bars are
standard errors.
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The results from the mental state stories clearly
indicate that children with ASD and poor ToM, as
indicated by an independent test battery, have sig-
nificant problems both in comparison to typically
developing children and children with ASD who
have relatively good ToM. Importantly, their poor
performance on the mental state stories is likely to
indicate a lack of understanding of mental states
rather than a problem comprehending text. The
strong correlation between the ToM battery and
the mental state stories also provides a validity
check that both instruments are tapping into the
same underlying ability. This is consistent with
findings from neuroimaging studies that these
mental state stories activate the brain’s mentalizing
network. A future battery of ToM tests designed
along psychometric principles would thus benefit
from the inclusion of the mental state Strange
Stories.
The present study is the first time that text
comprehension not involving agents has been
investigated in autism. In the case of the nature sto-
ries, no impairment was shown in the ASD group,
indicating intact text comprehension abilities. In
addition, the different types of stories allowed
examination of story understanding when different
degrees of mentalizing may have been evoked. Dif-
ficulties with the other sets, however, cannot be
attributed to more general text comprehension
difficulties.
Analysis of the interaction between story type
and group revealed a linear relation in performance
differences between the groups across the story
types (see Figure 3). First, this indicated that it was
the children with poor ToM who were having diffi-
culty with the stories and therefore that poor ToM
abilities might result in difficulty understanding not
only the mental but also the human and animal sets.
In addition, the linear interaction suggested that
each consecutive set of stories, which were designed
to be one more conceptual step away from the men-
tal state stories (see Table 2), was slightly less diffi-
cult for the ASD group with poor ToM than the
previous set. In other words, the greater the oppor-
tunity for mentalizing during the task, the more
impaired the poor ToM group appeared. This is
reminiscent of the trend seen in previous studies,
and found in the pilot study, for the mental state sto-
ries to be more difficult for individuals with ASD
than the human physical stories.
It seems likely that the stringent definition of
poor ToM in the ASD group resulted in some chil-
dren with ToM difficulties being categorized in the
relatively good ToM group; the interaction effect
size in the main experiment was small, most proba-
bly due to the group of children with relatively
good ToM performing between the controls and the
children with poor ToM on three of the measures
for this reason. This is supported by the fact that
these three measures were the mental, human, and
animal stories, exactly those that were difficult for
the children with poor ToM.
One parsimonious way of interpreting the inter-
action results is that the human stories may elicit
mentalizing in typically developing individuals
despite no explicit need to do so; individuals with
autism and poor ToM skills therefore perform
poorly on these tasks. This is consistent with previ-
ous findings of nonmentalistic text comprehension
difficulties in autism (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer,
2001; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999b; Norbury &
Bishop, 2002; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996), all of which
used tasks involving humans’ actions, words, or
thoughts. A similar implication from the results is
that typically developing individuals anthropomor-
phize nonhumans, as in the animal stories, to
understand their actions in terms of mental states;
again, individuals with autism and poor ToM skills
therefore perform poorly on these tasks. Previous
work from two independent groups of researchers
supports this notion, as control participants appear
to attribute mental states to animated triangles
instinctively and with ease, whereas individuals
with autism show difficulties in this area (Abell,
Happe´, & Frith, 2000; Castelli, Frith, Happe´, &
Frith, 2002; Klin, 2000). An alternate possibility is
that understanding agents is one component of
mentalizing and therefore that difficulties under-
standing agents might contribute toward the men-
talizing difficulties seen in autism.
Conversely, the nature stories and unlinked sen-
tences do not elicit mentalizing as they do not
involve understanding of agents; instead, these
story sets revealed that both text and sentence com-
prehension in the materials presented here are
intact in children with ASD, regardless of ToM abil-
ity. Although the passages of unlinked sentences
do involve humans, the questions did not require
the children to understand the actions of these peo-
ple (see Table 2). This implies that the text compre-
hension difficulties and mentalizing difficulties
both commonly reported in autism have hitherto
been confounded due to the materials used. Here,
where the two abilities are separated, it seems that
only mentalizing is a problem in autism, not text
comprehension. Mentalizing difficulties may there-
fore have been mistakenly regarded as text compre-
hension difficulties in the past.
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One possible limitation is in the presentation of
different story types during different sessions.
Although the direct comparison of the animal and
nature stories with the other three story sets should
be treated with slight caution given they were
administered approximately 4 months apart, it
seems unlikely that this would have a differential
effect on the results across the different groups.
General Discussion
The present results provide fresh evidence for a
specific deficit in mentalizing ability in ASD, sup-
porting the well-established ToM account. Use of
additional new story sets in high-functioning chil-
dren revealed that this impairment affects compre-
hension of stories involving people and animals.
This may be because mentalizing is also evoked to
a lesser degree by stories that do not explicitly
require understanding of others’ mental states and
even less still by stories involving nonhuman
agents. Alternatively, reasoning about biologic
agents may pose a difficulty for children with ASD
that contributes toward their mentalizing impair-
ment. Importantly, we could rule out a general
comprehension problem as the same children who
had difficulty making inferences about human and
animal actions were able to make inferences about
natural events, revealing intact text and sentence-
level comprehension.
This finding would be further supported by repli-
cation with all five story sets in adults and further
investigation of the neural mechanisms supporting
mental state reasoning across these story sets in aut-
ism. Following from the hypothesis that mentalizing
is evoked to a lesser degree by the human and ani-
mal stories, we would predict that a neuroimaging
study using these stories would demonstrate a grad-
ual decrease in activity in the network of brain areas
associated with mentalizing across the story types
from mental to nature in controls, and a decrease in
the difference in this neural activity between con-
trols and individuals with autism across these story
sets. This is consistent with studies showing an
overlap of regions involved in the processing of bio-
logic agents with those in the mentalizing network
and that these areas are activated to a lesser extent
by tasks involving agents than when considering
mental states (Fletcher et al., 1995; Gallagher et al.,
2000; Mitchell et al., 2002, 2005; Saxe & Kanwisher,
2003; Wheatley, Milleville, & Martin, 2007).
One issue that merits further discussion is that of
heterogeneity within the ASD groups. Although we
are confident that there are robust group differ-
ences in mentalizing as found in a large number of
studies, we do not claim that every individual with
ASD displays the same degree of mentalizing prob-
lems with the present tests. In the main experiment
here, a subgroup of children with ASD had distinct
and severe ToM impairments (with performance
below the fifth percentile for the control group),
whereas a few children with ASD appeared to be
performing complex mental state tasks at a level
commensurate with their age and general ability,
although the vast majority fell below the control
mean (82%). Whether good ToM task performance
in this minority of children is due to some form of
compensatory learning or indicates intact mentaliz-
ing abilities remains to be investigated, possibly
through a neuroimaging study of children with aut-
ism with good ToM task performance; normal acti-
vation of the mentalizing network would be
expected if mentalizing abilities were truly intact.
Severe ToM impairments also seemed to reflect
more severe social and communication difficulties,
supporting the role of ToM impairment in the pres-
ence of autistic symptomatology. All the children in
the ASD group did display significant symptoms of
autism though, either upholding the idea of com-
pensation in the children with good ToM perfor-
mance or indicating that there may be an
alternative cause of their symptoms.
This study confirms the value of the Strange
Stories in revealing difficulties in mental state
reasoning; particularly, these tasks seem better at
capturing individual variance in this ability than
traditional ToM tests. As the modified stories
proved suitable for use with high-functioning chil-
dren with autism, we would recommend the use of
the new sets of stories as they are well matched to
the mental state stories in difficulty. The nature sto-
ries in particular, may act as an ideal comparison
set, controlling for text comprehension abilities. As
regards testing of high-functioning adults, it is clear
that a new set of stories that allows for response
time data to be collected would be a logical next
step.
Given the success of the Strange Stories in con-
junction with brain imaging studies, the modified
stories would seem to provide a conceptually nea-
ter method for future studies of ToM abilities
in autism. The separation of text comprehension,
biologic agency and an explicit requirement for
mentalizing would allow a powerful paradigm for
the delineation of relevant brain regions. Further-
more, the comparison of those individuals with aut-
ism who largely succeed on ToM tasks and those
Revealing Mentalizing Impairments in Autism 1107
who largely fail, despite equal intelligence and age,
would be revealing with regards individual differ-
ences in the underlying causes of autism. In the
future, it may therefore be possible to use the sto-
ries to identify ‘‘fine cuts’’ between superficially
similar but essentially different components of
social cognition.
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Appendix
Strange Stories
The complete sets of stories are included as
follows. The mental state stories and the unlinked
sentences are suitable for use with both adults and
children; the new questions for the unlinked sen-
tences are a more suitable control task. The original
physical state stories are most suitable for high-
functioning adults, whereas the four new physical
stories in addition to the first four (as listed) origi-
nal physical stories are more suitable for children.
The animal and nature sets are matched for diffi-
culty to the other sets in children.
Mental State Stories
Simon is a big liar. Simon’s brother Jim knows
this, he knows that Simon never tells the truth!
Now yesterday Simon stole Jim’s ping-pong pad-
dle, and Jim knows Simon has hidden it some-
where, though he can’t find it. He’s very cross. So
he finds Simon and he says, ‘‘Where is my ping-
pong paddle? You must have hidden it either in
the cupboard or under your bed, because I’ve
looked everywhere else. Where is it, in the cup-
board or under your bed’’? Simon tells him the
paddle is under his bed.
Q: Why will Jim look in the cupboard for the
paddle?
2 points—reference to Jim knowing Simon lies
1 point—reference to facts (that’s where it really
is, Simon’s a big liar) or Simon hiding it without
reference to implications of lying
0 points—reference to general nonspecific infor-
mation (because he looked everywhere else)
During the war, the Red army captures a member
of the Blue army. They want him to tell them where
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his army’s tanks are; they know they are either by
the sea or in the mountains. They know that the
prisoner will not want to tell them, he will want to
save his army, and so he will certainly lie to them.
The prisoner is very brave and very clever, he will
not let them find his tanks. The tanks are really in
the mountains. Now when the other side asks him
where his tanks are, he says, ‘‘They are in the
mountains.’’
Q: Why did the prisoner say that?
2 points—reference to fact that other army will
not believe and hence look in other place, reference
to prisoner’s realization that that’s what they’ll do,
or reference to double bluff
1 point—reference to outcome (to save his army’s
tanks) or to mislead them
0 points—reference to motivation that misses the
point of double bluff (he was scared)
Brian is always hungry. Today at school it is his
favourite meal—sausages and beans. He is a very
greedy boy, and he would like to have more sau-
sages than anybody else, even though his mother
will have made him a lovely meal when he gets
home! But everyone is allowed two sausages and
no more. When it is Brian’s turn to be served, he
says, ‘‘Oh, please can I have four sausages, because
I won’t be having any dinner when I get home!’’
Q: Why does Brian say this?
2 points—reference to fact that he’s trying to elicit
sympathy, being deceptive
1 point—reference to his state (greedy), outcome
(to get more sausages) or factual
0 points—reference to a motivation that misses
the point of sympathy elicitation ⁄deception, or fac-
tually incorrect
Jill wanted to buy a kitten, so she went to see
Mrs. Smith, who had lots of kittens she didn’t want.
Now Mrs. Smith loved the kittens, and she
wouldn’t do anything to harm them, though
she couldn’t keep them all herself. When Jill visited
she wasn’t sure she wanted one of Mrs. Smith’s
kittens, since they were all males and she had
wanted a female. But Mrs. Smith said, ‘‘If no one
buys the kittens I’ll just have to drown them!’’
Q: Why did Mrs. Smith say that?
2 points—reference to persuasion, manipulating
feelings, trying to induce guilt ⁄pity
1 point—reference to outcome (to sell them or get
rid of them in a way which implies not drowning)
or simple motivation (to make Jill sad)
0 points—reference to general knowledge or
dilemma without realization that the statement was
not true (she’s a horrible woman)
One day Aunt Jane came to visit Peter. Now
Peter loves his aunt very much, but today she is
wearing a new hat; a new hat which Peter thinks is
very ugly indeed. Peter thinks his aunt looks silly
in it, and much nicer in her old hat. But when Aunt
Jane asks Peter, ‘‘How do you like my new hat?,’’
Peter says, ‘‘Oh, its very nice.’’
Q: Why does he say that?
2 points—reference to white lie or wanting to
spare her feelings; some implication that this is for
aunt’s benefit rather than just for his, desire to
avoid rudeness or insult
1 point—reference to trait (he’s a nice boy) or
relationship (he likes his aunt); purely motivational
(so she won’t shout at him) with no reference to
aunt’s thoughts or feelings; incomplete explanation
(he’s lying, he’s pretending).
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
facts ⁄ feelings (he likes the hat, he wants to trick
her)
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she
knew at Christmas she could ask her parents for a
rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything
in the world. At last Christmas Day arrived, and
Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had
given her. She felt sure it would contain a little rab-
bit in a cage. But when she opened it, with all the
family standing round, she found her present was
just a boring old set of encyclopedias, which Helen
did not want at all! Still, when Helen’s parents
asked her how she liked her Christmas present, she
said, ‘‘It’s lovely, thank you. It’s just what I
wanted.’’
Q: Why did she say this?
2 points—reference to white lie or wanting to
spare their feelings; some implication that this is
for parent’s benefit rather than just for her, desire
to avoid rudeness or insult
1 point—reference to trait (she’s a nice girl) or
relationship (she likes her parents); purely motiva-
tional (so they won’t shout at her) with no reference
to parent’s thoughts or feelings; incomplete expla-
nation (she’s lying, she’s pretending)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
facts ⁄ feelings (she likes the present, she wants to
trick them)
Late one night old Mrs. Peabody is walking home.
She doesn’t like walking home alone in the dark
because she is always afraid that someone will
attack her and rob her. She really is a very nervous
person! Suddenly, out of the shadows comes a man.
He wants to ask Mrs. Peabody what time it is, so he
walks toward her. When Mrs. Peabody sees the man
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coming toward her, she starts to tremble and says,
‘‘Take my purse, just don’t hurt me please!’’
Q: Why did she say that?
2 points—reference to her belief that he was going
to mug her or her ignorance of his real intention
1 point—reference to her trait (she’s nervous) or
state (she’s scared) or intention (so he wouldn’t hurt
her) without suggestion that fear was unnecessary
0 points—factually incorrect ⁄ irrelevant answers;
reference to the man actually intending to attack her
A burglar who has just robbed a shop is making
his getaway. As he is running home, a policeman
on his beat sees him drop his glove. He doesn’t
know the man is a burglar, he just wants to tell him
he dropped his glove. But when the policeman
shouts out to the burglar, ‘‘Hey, you! Stop!,’’ the
burglar turns round, sees the policeman and gives
himself up. He puts his hands up and admits that
he did the break-in at the local shop.
Q: Why did the burglar do that?
2 points—reference to belief that policeman knew
that he’d burgled the shop
1 point—reference to something factually correct
in story
0 points—factually incorrect ⁄ irrelevant answers
Original Physical Stories
Two enemy powers have been at war for a very
long time. Each army has won several battles, but
now the outcome could go either way. The forces are
equally matched. However, the Blue army is stron-
ger than the Yellow army in foot soldiers and artil-
lery. But the Yellow army is stronger than the Blue
Army in air power. On the day of the final battle,
which will decide the outcome of the war, there is
heavy fog over the mountains where the fighting is
about to occur. Low-lying clouds hang above the sol-
diers. By the end of the day the Blue army has won.
Q: Why did the Blue army win?
2 points—reference to both weather conditions
and either relative ground superiority or inability
of other army’s planes to be useful in fog (names of
armies unimportant)
1 point—reference either to weather or relative
superiority on ground versus air (because it was
foggy); nothing about why weather makes it espe-
cially difficult for planes or nothing about planes
being affected more than tanks; reference to fog to
justify incorrect response (the aeroplanes won
because the fog meant they could hide from the
tanks)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
information (they won because they had better
planes); justifications for why tanks are better than
planes
A burglar is about to break into a jewelers’ shop.
He skillfully picks the lock on the shop door. Care-
fully he steps over the electronic detector beam. If
he breaks this beam it will set off the alarm. Quietly
he opens the door of the store-room and sees the
gems glittering. As he reaches out, however, he
steps on something soft. He hears a screech and
something small and furry runs out past him,
toward the shop door. Immediately the alarm
sounds.
Q: Why did the alarm go off?
2 points—reference to animal which the burglar
disturbed setting off alarm by crossing beam (type
of animal unimportant)
1 point—reference to burglar setting off alarm (he
was startled by the animal so crossed the beam);
reference to animal setting off alarm without
explaining it crossed the beam (he trod on a cat
and it set off the alarm)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (the animal’s screech set off the alarm); alterna-
tive reasons for alarm going off (a security camera
saw him and set the alarm off)
[A slight change has been made to this story from
the original, which read ‘‘Carefully he crawls under
. . . ,’’ as many participants in Experiment 1 found
the wording confusing.]
Old Mrs. Robinson is very frail. One day she slips
on her icy door step and falls on her side. She gets
up right away, although she feels quite bruised and
shaken. The next day her leg feels very stiff and
she can scarcely walk. She makes her way to the
doctors. As soon as the doctor hears about the fall,
and sees her swollen side, he says, ‘‘Go immedi-
ately to the hospital.’’ At the hospital they take an
X-ray.
Q: Why did they take an X-ray?
2 points—reference to possibility that she has
fractured ⁄broken her hip ⁄ leg; reference to wanting
to know or trying to find out (i.e., ‘‘it was broken’’
is not enough); must refer to fact that X-rays are for
broken things or bones (to see if there’s any dam-
age to the bone)
1 point—reference to general aim (to see what’s
wrong, because of her fall she might have damaged
something) or factually correct (it’s bruised and
stiff)
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0 points—reference to irrelevant (because she fell)
or incorrect factors (that’s what doctors do) or to
X-rays being cures themselves (to mend her leg)
John is going shopping. He buys a nice new desk
lamp, for his study. He needs a light bulb for his
new lamp. He goes from the furniture department
to the electrical department. In the electrical depart-
ment he finds that there are two brands of light
bulb of the right kind. Everbrite light bulbs cost less
in single packs than Literite bulbs. However, only
Literite bulbs come in multipacks of six. John buys
the multipack, even though he only needs one bulb.
Q: Why does John buy the Literite bulbs?
2 points—reference to saving money by buying
the multipack
1 point—reference to convenience of having more
bulbs, or future need for more than one bulb; no
mention of saving money
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors (Literite bulbs are brighter)
Mrs. Simpson, the librarian, receives a special
book which she has to catalogue and find an appro-
priate place for. She has to decide which section to
file it under. The library is very big, and has differ-
ent sections on many different subjects. The new
book is about plants and their medical uses, and is
heavily illustrated. However, Mrs. Simpson does
not put it on the shelf with the rest of the books on
botany. Neither does she put it with the books on
medicine. Instead, she carefully takes it into a sepa-
rate room. In this room all the books are kept in
special cases, and the temperature is kept constant.
Q: Why did she do this?
2 points—reference to avoiding damage to the
book because it is special
1 point—reference to the fact that the book is spe-
cial; no reference to why it might be kept in a spe-
cial case
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (she doesn’t know where else to put it)
Henry is preparing for a big dinner party. He is
famous for his excellent mayonnaise. He has
bought lots of fresh eggs. The recipe says, ‘‘Care-
fully separate the yolks of six eggs and add oil very
gradually.’’ He has already bought easily enough
dessert to feed everyone. However, he now looks
up the recipe for meringues. Henry will not waste
anything.
Q: Why does Henry make meringues?
2 points—reference to Henry not liking to waste
anything and therefore using up the left-over egg
whites
1 point—reference either to not wasting anything
or to having left-over egg whites
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (he’s having a party)
Paul is very rich, and today he is going to buy an
expensive new car. He is considering whether to
make a single payment, or whether to spread the
cost over the year. If he pays in monthly install-
ments, the dealer will charge 5% interest on the
loan. His bank currently gives him 8% interest
on the money in his account. Even though he has
easily enough money to pay the full amount, he
decides to pay by monthly installments.
Q: Why does he do that?
2 points—reference to getting more interest from
the bank than he’d pay on the loan and therefore to
saving money
1 point—reference to saving money; no explana-
tion why he’d save money
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors (he doesn’t have enough money)
Sarah is very far-sighted. She has only one pair of
glasses, which she keeps losing. Today she has lost
her glasses again and she needs to find them. She
had them yesterday evening when she looked up
the television programs. She must have left them
somewhere that she has been today. She asks Ted
to find her glasses. She tells him that today she
went to her regular early morning exercise class,
then to the post office, and last to the flower shop.
Ted goes straight to the post office.
Q: Why is the post office the most likely place to
look?
2 points—reference to post office being place she
would most likely use her glasses (to read ⁄write ⁄
look at stamps etc); may talk about either putting
glasses on or taking them off
1 point—plausible alternative reason for being in
post office (there are lots of people there, you might
have posted them by mistake, people take lost
things there)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors (that was the last place she went, you can
buy glasses at the post office, she needed the
glasses to hear better); general factors, nonspecific
to post offices
New Human Physical Stories
Bob and Jim are best friends. They are both
10 years old. Bob has brown hair, green eyes and is
over 5 feet tall. Jim looks very different to Bob. He
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has blonde hair and blue eyes and he is much smal-
ler than Bob. Bob and Jim go on an outing to the fun
fair. They go on lots of rides. For the last ride of the
day they decide to go on the big rollercoaster. But
there is a sign which says: For safety reasons no per-
sons under 5 feet are allowed on.
Q: Why does only Bob go on the rollercoaster?
2 points—reference to Jim being too short for the
ride or Bob being tall enough (Jim’s less than 5 feet)
1 point—reference to Jim being short or Bob
being tall or both; no reference to height in compar-
ison to the limit (Jim’s shorter than Bob)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (Jim doesn’t like rollercoasters)
Rupert has never been skiing before and is look-
ing forward to his first skiing holiday this winter.
All his kit for the holiday has been well prepared;
his mum has bought him a pair of goggles and she
has thoroughly waxed and polished the bottom of
his skis to protect them. On the first day of Rupert’s
holiday his skis keep slipping from underneath
him, making him fall over into the snow.
Q: Why does Rupert keep falling over?
2 points—reference to Rupert’s Mum having
waxed the skis, making them slippery
1 point—reference to Rupert’s never having skied
before
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (his skis are loose)
Clare is having her room redecorated; her mother
is painting the walls and having new curtains
hung. Before, Clare’s room was pink and white
with thin net curtains but now the walls are dark
red, and brand new thick and expensive velvet cur-
tains have been put up. On the first morning in her
new room, Clare fails to wake up at the normal
time. As her mother rushes to get her out of bed for
school, Clare says it must be too early to get up
because it ‘‘feels like the middle of the night.’’
Q: Why did Clare oversleep?
2 points—reference to the room being darker
after redecoration (her room is dark now that she
has thicker curtains)
1 point—reference to redecoration; no reference
to this making the room darker
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (she’s too tired, she doesn’t want to go to
school)
Sam decides to go on a long walk to get some
fresh air. Unfortunately, just after leaving the
house, the wind begins to pick up and it starts to
rain. Luckily Sam always has an umbrella with
him. He quickly puts up the umbrella and wraps
his coat tightly around him. Suddenly a gust of
wind blows the umbrella straight out of Sam’s
hand and it lands in a large, very prickly bush.
Sam manages to run and fetch it before it blows off
again and is pleased to find it all in one piece. As
he walks home, he notices that his head is starting
to get wet despite the umbrella.
Q: Why is Sam getting wet?
2 points—reference to the bush making holes in
the umbrella
1 point—reference to either the bush or to holes
in the umbrella
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors (it was raining, he hasn’t got an umbrella)
Animal Stories
Emperor penguins live in the Antarctica, where
it is extremely cold. There is always snow on the
ground and ice on the surface of the sea.
Emperor penguins can often be found standing
clumped together in huge, huddled masses. Every
few minutes, a penguin in the middle of the hud-
dle moves to the edge of the huddle, changing
places with one of the penguins on the outside of
the group.
Q: Why do the penguins keep changing places?
2 points—reference to the middle penguin being
the warmest or to taking turns at being warm
1 point—reference to keeping warm without
relating this to the huddle
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Snakes are remarkable animals. They have very
stretchy skin, which they shed once a year and can
also separate their upper and lower jaws and open
their mouths really wide. The anaconda is an exam-
ple of a very large snake. One day, a deer gallops
under a tree, from which an anaconda is hanging,
as it makes its way toward a lake. Later that day,
the snake is lying on the ground with a huge bulge
in its middle. The deer however is nowhere to be
seen.
Q: Where is the deer?
2 points—reference to the snake having eaten the
deer (in the snake’s tummy)
1 point—reference to the deer having been eaten
or being dead without reference to the snake
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
It has been raining for days and days and there
are no signs that it is going to stop anytime soon. A
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little island lies in the middle of a huge river. The
water in the river has been slowly rising each day
and it has nearly reached the top of the river banks.
The otters swim around in the water and the field
mice run about the island gathering food. Five days
later, the rain has finally stopped. The otters still
swim in the water, but there are no signs of the
field mice.
Q: What has happened to the field mice?
2 points—reference to the field mice having
drown or being dead because of the water
1 point—reference to them being dead without
reference to water or to the water taking them away
without reference to them being dead
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Lions are fierce hunters. They can run as fast as a
car when they are young and fit but they get very
slow and weak when they are old. One very hot
day, an old and hungry lion is standing at the mouth
of a cave, watching a herd of zebras moving across a
large open plain. When the herd has passed by, the
lion begins to chase a small zebra at the back of the
herd. One by one, the zebras nimbly jump across a
river. But the lion returns to the cave, still hungry.
Q: Why is the lion still hungry?
2 points—reference to the lion being old or slow
or weak and so not being able to catch the zebras
(he was too old and weak to jump over the river)
1 point—reference to the lion being unable to
catch the zebras without reference to him being old
or slow or weak (he couldn’t jump across the river
to catch the zebras)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Some types of birds, like geese and swallows,
only like very warm weather. When it is winter
in England, it is still very warm in other coun-
tries that are further south. Last autumn, flocks of
swallows could be seen flying in huge groups in
the same direction away from England. At the
beginning of summer, these swallows flew back
to England.
Q: What were the swallows doing?
2 points—reference to migration or to flying to
the place where it is currently warm
1 point—reference to specific examples without a
general understanding of finding warm places
(they were going away from the cold weather in
England; they were going away to a hotter country)
or to keeping warm without any explanation
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Swordfish come in many different colors; black,
grayish blue, brown, purple, and bronze. They
often live in tropical places where the water is very
warm. In these tropical places, the weather some-
times gets so hot that thunderstorms occur. When
this happens, huge waves crash onto the beaches
and travel a long way up the land. On one very hot
day in Hawaii, a swordfish is lying on the beach.
Q: Why is the swordfish lying there?
2 points—reference to the swordfish having been
washed up onto the beach by a huge wave or the
storm
1 point—reference to the storm or sea or waves
without reference to the swordfish
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Seals have very big eyes and long whiskers that
help them to sense tiny movements. Underwater
they use their whiskers to find fish so they can then
catch the fish and eat them. A seal without any
whiskers at all, is lying on a rock in the North Sea.
This seal is very, very thin and tired.
Q: Why is this seal so thin?
2 points—reference to the seal having no whis-
kers and therefore not being able to find fish
1 point—reference either to not having eaten or
to not having whiskers
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Animals that live in groups often have an order
of importance within the group. The strongest male
is the leader of the group. This leader will often
attack other animals in the group who are not as
strong as this leader. This shows the other animals
how important the leader is. In a group of chickens
a very small chicken hasn’t got many of its feathers
left.
Q: Why hasn’t this chicken got many feathers
left?
2 points—reference to the chicken having been
attacked by the leader ⁄a larger chicken or having
been attacked because of its size
1 point—reference either to the chicken’s size or
to having been attacked (reference to it being young
rather than small do not count)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Natural Physical State Stories
In stormy weather, rocks often fall from the top
of mountains. One day on a mountain in the
Dolomites, a very large boulder becomes loose and
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starts rolling down the mountain. It rolls and rolls
and rolls, gathering speed and spinning and bounc-
ing off the mountain side. Suddenly, there is a very
noisy splash.
Q: Why is there a loud splash?
2 points—reference to the boulder falling into
water to make the splash (the boulder must have
fallen into a lake)
1 point—reference to water without reference to
the boulder (there was a pool at the bottom of the
mountain)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors (it’s very big so it’s very noisy)
A storm is building up over a little village in the
mountains. There is thunder and lightening. The
trees sway in the heavy gusts of wind, and the rain
is pouring down. Leaves and even some branches
are falling from the trees. After one extremely
bright flash of lightning, there is a loud crashing
noise and the lights go out in all of the houses in
the village.
Q: Why did the lights go out?
2 points—reference to the lightning hitting a tree
which fell onto a power line and cut the electricity
(the lightning hit a tree which crashed into the elec-
tricity wires)
1 point—reference to lightning hitting power
lines
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
It is a very cold winter and has been snowing for
days and days. The snow has covered everything;
the trees, the houses, the hilltops, even the fences
are covered in a thick layer of snow. Everything
looks completely white apart from the dull gray
sky. One morning, the skies are blue and the sun
comes out. The sun beats down on the houses, the
trees, the hilltops, and the fences. Puddles start to
form at the edges of the fields.
Q: Why are there lots of puddles?
2 points—reference to the snow melting or the
effect of the sun on the snow (the sun makes the
snow turn into water)
1 point—reference to the snow without reference
to melting or the sun (because of the snow)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
The little village of Littlehurst is close to the river
Worrow. A year ago, a wall was built all the way
round the edge of the village. The river floods its
banks in April every year and, in the past, water
would flow into many houses and cause lots of
damage. For 3 weeks now the rain has been
pouring down. However, this year, all the houses
in Littlehurst are perfectly dry inside.
Q: Why were all the houses dry?
2 points—reference to the wall stopping the water
entering the village
1 point—reference either to the wall or to the
water not getting in but no connection between the
two
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
The summer has been long and very warm, just
the right conditions for producing lots of apples.
All summer long the orchard has been quiet and
peaceful. Now, at the end of summer, the apples
hang from the trees, glistening in the bright sun, all
ripe and rosy. And every now and then in the orch-
ard, little thumps can be heard.
Q: Why are there little thumps?
2 points—reference to the apples falling from the
trees or hitting the ground
1 point—reference to the apples without mention
of them falling or hitting the ground
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
One of the huge parks in the middle of London
has stone statues all around the edge of it. It also
has lots of trees, which drop their leaves in autumn
every year. On a cold, dry morning in November, a
huge bonfire is burning all the leaves in one corner
of the park and the statues in that corner of the
park can’t be seen. But in the afternoon, it is clear
that they are still there.
Q: What had happened in the morning?
2 points—reference to the smoke from the fire
covering the statues
1 point—reference to the bonfire or smoke with-
out explaining how this affected the statues
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect fac-
tors including incorrect reference to the fire (it
burnt down the statues)
It is late in April and the sky has been clear and
blue all morning. An empty fountain sparkles in
the middle of the park. As the day goes on, the sun
occasionally disappears behind little white fluffy
clouds, soon to appear again on the other side.
However in the late afternoon, the sky becomes
dark and filled with lots of gray clouds. A little
after this, the fountain starts to spout water.
Q: Why did the fountain spout water?
2 points—reference to the rain filling up the
empty fountain
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1 point—reference to either to rain or to the foun-
tain being filled up
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Iceland is a country where earthquakes often
occur. They happen very suddenly when big rocks
under the ground suddenly move, making the
ground shake. One day last year, the ground
started to shake near a mountain in the south of
Iceland. As the ground shook more and more, a
large cloud of smoke appeared above the moun-
tain and huge flames roared from the mountain
top.
Q: Why did this happen?
2 points—reference to a volcano or to an earth-
quake starting a volcano (reference to larva or simi-
lar is also fine)
1 point—reference to the earthquake (because the
ground under mountain was shaking)
0 points—reference to irrelevant or incorrect
factors
Unlinked Sentences (First Question Is Original
Question; Second Is New Question)
The two countries had been at war. A housewife
is about to enter the super-market. Today he is
going to buy an expensive new stereo. Mrs. Brown,
the postmistress, receives a special parcel. Mrs.
Pearson wouldn’t harm a fly. Mary’s birthday is in
February. Late one evening the old man was watch-
ing television.
Q: Is Mary’s birthday in February?
2 points—Yes
0 points—No
Q: When is Mary’s birthday?
2 points—February
0 points—Anything else
Young Simon is very robust. She sees that Fred
cannot play. Jeremy is always laughing. Ruth sees
her uncle very often, but today he has gone to Bra-
zil. Richard is packing up to go away. Today, at
college, it is Jim’s worst lecture—statistical mechan-
ics. She has only one dollar left, which she must
keep for her bus fare. He buys a bright tie, to go
with his new shirt.
Q: Does she have $2 left?
2 points—No
0 points—Yes
Q: How many dollars does she have left?
2 points—One
0 points—Anything else
Simon takes the special butter from the refrigera-
tor. Each boxer has won several fights. He skillfully
picks out the imperfect items. They are either in
Boston or in New York. She has to cut the grass
and find somewhere to plant the bay tree. The con-
ductor sees that the cellist has broken a string.
Tracy took the bus to the station.
Q: Did Tracy take the bus?
2 points—Yes
0 points—No
Q: Where did Tracy take the bus to?
2 points—The station
1 point—Anything that seems part way there
(e.g., the bus station)
0 points—Anything else
The four brothers stood aside to make room for
their sister, Stella. Gill repeated the experiment,
several times. The name of the airport has changed.
Louise uncorked a little bottle of oil. The 2 children
had to abandon their daily walk. She took a suite in
a grand hotel. It was already 20 years since the
operation.
Q: Did the children take their walk?
2 points—No
0 points—Yes
Q: Who abandoned their daily walk?
2 points—The 2 children
1 point—Anything that seems part way there
(e.g., the children)
0 points—Anything else
One day Uncle Simon came to visit Alex. The
first part of the performance had come to an end.
He put away the letter and stuck his hands in his
pockets. She was still holding her umbrella. The
cats ran back to the boy. Flora came into the
middle of the square. The little island had a high
rocky shoreline.
Q: Did Flora go to the square?
2 points—Yes
0 points—No
Q: Where did Flora go to?
2 points—The middle of the square
1 point—Anything that seems part way there
(e.g., the square)
0 points—Anything else
At the edge of the road a little grass was growing.
He reaches out to find the light switch. A sailor
who has just left his ship is walking to the town.
She has to decide where to keep the pasta. At last
daylight came, and Tommy got out of bed to open
his presents. Jim knows all about investing money,
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as he works in a large bank. They exchanged a few
brief words about the weather.
Q: Did Tommy stay in bed?
2 points—No
0 points—Yes
Q: Why did Tommy get out of bed?
2 points—To open his presents
1 point—Anything that seems part way there
(e.g., coz daylight came ⁄ it was morning)
0 points—Anything else
She is always saying that someone will eventually
find the treasure. Everyone is allowed two visits
and no more. At the psychiatry department they
were interviewing the new nurses. Jim will win the
first race of the meeting. She has taken all the chil-
dren to visit the zoo today. Simon’s uncle is wear-
ing a new suit. The same phrase of twenty-three
notes recurred throughout.
Q: Will Jim lose the first race?
2 points—No
0 points—Yes
Q: What will Jim win?
2 points—The first race of the meeting ⁄ the first
race
1 point—Anything that seems part way there
(e.g., the race)
0 points—Anything else
He needs a new engine for his old car. The prize
is an immediate lump sum of $20,000 tax-free.
Japan is stronger than Italy in economic terms. The
mother is very brave and long suffering. The new
book is about statistics and experimental design,
and contains many graphs. The front room con-
tained a little bird in a cage. Although Jim is only
29 years old, he has an income of $20,000 per year.
There are not many people this evening in the large
rectangular dining room.
Q: Is the mother brave?
2 points—Yes
0 points—No
Q: Who is brave and long suffering?
2 points—The mother
0 points—Anything else
Revealing Mentalizing Impairments in Autism 1117
